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ABSTRACT
Valuation of intangible assets is a complex topic where traditional methodologies are not always
successful. Nevertheless, intangible assets, like patents, have become of great importance to
companies, as their value is considered to be relevant economic and strategic information, so
it is necessary to evaluate firms’ patent portfolios. The present research introduces an extended
goal programming model to calculate the relative importance of the patents of companies in a
patent pool. This information may be useful for patent valuation as well as for management
purposes. The proposed multicriteria methodology has been applied to the 19 companies in the
MPEG2 patent pool, with a total of 770 valid patents, using 7 criteria to obtain a composite
measure of the relative position of the firms in the patent pool.
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RESUMEN
La  valoración  de  activos  intangibles  constituye  un  área  compleja  donde  los  métodos
tradicionales no siempre obtienen buenos resultados. Sin embargo, los activos intangibles,
entre ellos las patentes, han ganado importancia en las empresas, de forma que el cálculo
de su valor se ha convertido en una cuestión estratégica en muchos casos. Este hecho
requiere  que  las  empresas  valoren  la  cartera  de  patentes  en  su  conjunto.  La  presente
investigación presenta un modelo extendido de programación por metas y su aplicación
para el cálculo de la importancia relativa de las patentes. Este modelo puede resultar
importante tanto para la valoración de las patentes como para la gestión empresarial. La
metodología multicriterio propuesta ha sido aplicado a 19 empresas en el sector de las
patentes del formato MPEG2, con un total de 770 patentes válidas, y utilizando 7 criterios
con el objetivo de obtener una medida compuesta de la posición relativa de las empresas
en el conjunto de patentes.
PALABRAS  CLAVE:  Valoración  de  patentes,  Análisis  multicriterio,  Programación  por
Metas, Ranking de empresas, Gestión estratégica.11
INTRODUCTION
As an essential part of companies’ intangible assets, patents and patent statistics have long
been scrutinized by researchers. In recent years, patent assessment has been used not only
to evaluate company innovation level or competition status within a given industry but also
in applied for patent portfolio analysis as part of corporate strategy. Innovators spare no
efforts on R&D investment, aiming for substantial royalty return from licensing. Like the
primary research on intangible assets pricing, this paper introduces a patent portfolio
evaluation  method  based  on  multicriteria  analysis.  By  applying  this  technological
performance analysis, a better estimation of the relative standing within one’s sector can
be  revealed  for  stakeholders  such  as  shareholders,  executives,  suppliers,  clients,
employees, creditors and also for technological analysts, consultants and even competitors
who have no direct connection with the firm.
Building on earlier works by Pakes (1986), Harhoff et al. (2003) and Reitzig (2004) it turns
out that evaluation approaches using patent indicators seem especially convenient for
assessing patent portfolios with a large number of patent characteristics. Many studies use
a single indicator (raw patent counts, patent citations, patent length and breadth, or patent
claims), arguing that the specific indicator that is applied has fewer shortcomings than
others. Some studies use more indicators to generate one conduct, in which individual
indicators are weighted either directly (interviews or surveys with experts) or indirectly
(factor analysis). Instead of assuming the correctness of a single indicator, in this paper, 7
validated  indicators  drawn  from  publicly  available  patent  databases  are  computed  for
individual patents that can then be fed into evaluation algorithms yielding the patent
portfolio value of companies. This multi-criteria analysis allows us to establish a more
complex, informative, objective model for composite measure of patent portfolio analysis
and corporate innovation competition position within a specific industry.
The aim of this work is to elaborate easy-to-understand information that shows the relative
importance of the patents of a company in a patent pool. This information can be used by
patent valuers and top management to define the strategic planning of the companies.
Notice that the aim of this research is not to economically value a patent pool, but to rank
firms according to the importance of their patents. In contrast to other methodologies like
the  Analytic  Hierarchy  Process  (AHP),  our  proposal  only  considers  quantitative
information  about  patents  to  reduce  the  subjectivity  of  the  process  of  quantifying
qualitative information. This is the main difference compared to previous studies.
Another important question is the simultaneous consideration of several indicators about
patents in order to construct the ranking. Other approaches usually focus on a single
measure, so the ranking can be very different depending on the selected indicator, and
cannot be considered a reliable ranking because only a particular dimension of the patents
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firm is taken into account. In such cases, one alternative can rank the first position when
a  particular  variable  is  considered,  but  a  much  lower  position  if  another  variable  is
considered instead.
Thus, the proposed methodology enables to evaluate patents from a multicriteria perspective.
The evaluation of their patents can be very informative both for the firm and stakeholders,
which can make their investment decisions taking into account this information.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next Section resumes previous
research into patent evaluation. Section 3 introduces the proposed methodology. Then, in
Section 4, the indicators used in the multicriteria model to evaluate patent pools are
defined. Section 5 applies the new methodology to the evaluation of the MPEG2 patent
pool. Finally, the conclusions and possible topics for further research are discussed.
BACKGROUND
Harhoff and Reitzig (2002) combine estimates of the patent right’s value from a survey of
patent holders with a set of indicators in order to adopt a regression model and suggest that
patent’s citations, family size and opposition are positively related to its value. Later,
Harhoff et al. (2003) conclude that references to the non-patent literature are informative
about the value of pharmaceutical and chemical patents, but not in other technical fields
analyzed by these authors.
Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003) studied the innovative performance of nearly 1,200 companies
in four high-tech industries using a two-stage factor analysis and compositely construct a
latent variable ‘innovative performance’ based on four indicators. The latent variable gives
innovative  performance  of  companies  a  broad,  overall  interpretation  by  taking  into
considerations different indicators. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) also constructed a
factor model and developed a minimum-variance index of patent ‘quality’ based on three
patent indicators- number of claims, forward citations, backward citations. These multiple
indicators  reduced  the  variance  in  patent  quality  considerably,  and  confirmed  that
quantitative information could gain from exploiting detailed patent characteristics.
Van Pottelsberghe and van Zeebroeck (2008) propose the scope-year index as an indicator
of patent value, by combining both the renewal of patents and their geographical scope.
However no theoretical justification on how to combine these two dimensions is provided.
Reitzig (2004) analyzes the appropriateness of the 13 best-known indicators for business
purposes by 23 empirical studies related to patent value and exploited more indicators of
patent value by looking into patent attorney’s filing rationales to enhance the quality of
existing valuation methods.
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Patent  valuation  is  a  topic  that  has  also  received  great  attention  from  researchers.
Gambardella et al. (2006) try to estimate the determinants of the private economic value
of  patents  from  a  questionnaire  survey  of  European  EPO  patents.  They  find  that  the
characteristics of the individual investor are a more important determinant of the private
value of patents than the characteristics of the organization in which he or she works.
Bessen (2008) examines the value drivers of patents, controlling both for patent and owner
characteristics. He finds that U.S. patent values are higher on average than estimates for
European patents, but the ratio of U.S. patent value to R&D for firms is only about 3%. He
also concludes that patent citations explain little variance in value, suggesting limits to
their use as a measure of patent quality.
These findings may support the inclusion of intangible variables in the valuation process
of  patents.  As  an  example  of  this,  Chiu  and  Chen  (2007)  use  AHP  to  quantify  some
qualitative variables. They propose an objective scoring system for intellectual property
patents from the licensor side. When no quantitative information is available, an expert
must determine the relative importance of each patent valuation dimension.
More  traditional  methodologies  have  been  also  used  in  the  valuation  of  patents,  like
discounted cash flow and option based methods (Pitkethly, 1997). However, none of these
approaches are applied in our research because the aim of the paper is not to value a
particular patent.
METHODOLOGY
It has become acknowledged that single-criterion valuation of patents has limitations of
unthoroughness and distortion. Evidently, involving a number of incommensurable factors
in generating the composite index for patent evaluation is the alternative, and this falls
into  the  category  of  Multiple  Criteria  Analysis.  Multiple  Criteria  Decision  Making
(MCDM) approach retains the advantages and enables exploiting of detailed information
from individual indicators.
The essential issue in multi-criteria evaluation is to determine the weights of each factor
and there are two fundamentally different ways to do so (Zeleny, 1982). One is direct
explication, in which interviews, questionnaire surveys with experts are main determinants
of factor weights. The other is indirect explication, in which the weights are determined
objectively, for example via regression analysis or mathematical programming techniques
based on the observed samples. In this paper, we compose an Extended Goal Programming
approach to analyze the relative patent value in patent pools.
Goal  programming  (GP)  is  a  branch  of  Multicriteria  Decision  Making  Methodology
(MCDM). It is essentially an extension or generalization of linear programming to handle
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multiple, normally conflicting objective measures. Each of these measures is given a goal
or target value to be achieved and unwanted deviations from this set of target values are
then minimized in an achievement function. GP was first introduced by Charnes, Cooper
and  Ferguson  in  1955 in  a  model  for  executive  compensation.  Numerous  subsequent
studies have been following this approach, seminal works by Lee (1972), Ignizio (1976),
and Romero (1991) followed. 
Depending on the norm used, the solution arrived at can be interpreted either as one in
which  the  consensus  between  all  the  measures  is  maximized  (penalizing  the  more
conflicting measures in favor of those that are more representative of the majority trend)
or as one where preference is given to the most conflicting measures (thereby penalizing
the measures that share the most information with the rest). In the first case, the absolute
difference between the multi-criteria performance and the single-criterion performances is
minimized (norm L1); in the second case, it is the greatest difference between the multi-
criteria performance and the single-criterion performances that is minimized (norm L∞).
The model in norm L1 is shown in [1].
Achievement function:
Min
s.t.
Goals:
i=1, …, n,  j=1, …, c [1]
Hard constraint:
Accounting rows:
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Where:
=weight to be attributed to the jth criterion.
=negative (positive) deviation variable. It quantifies the difference by excess or
deficiency  between  the  value  of  the  ith firm  in  the  jth criterion  and  the  multi-criteria
performance  that  results  from  applying  the  weights  ;  that  is  to  say,
, with  . The achievement function assures that only
one of the two deviation variables can be greater than zero:  .
=degree of discrepancy between the jth performance and the multi-criteria performance.
=accounting of the overall discrepancy.
Model [1] has n c constraints labeled as ‘goals’. This means that for each criterion j
(j=1,…,c) the model computes n constraints, one per firm i (i=1,…,n), and must determine
the value of the weight associated with criterion j,  . This can be achieved by minimizing
the absolute difference between the performance of each firm in criterion j,  , and the
computed multi-criteria performance  , with                   . 
The  value  of  the  achievement  function  provides  the  degree  to  which  the  set  of  goals
remains unsatisfied; that is, the difference in absolute terms between the multi-criteria
performance and the set of single-criterion performances. Weights are normalized so that
their sum is equal to 1 (hard constraint). The final restrictions (accounting rows) serve to
compute  the  multi-criteria  performance  of  the  firms  ( ),  the  degree  of  discrepancy
between each single-criterion performance measure and the multi-criteria performance
( ) and the degree of overall deviation ( ). In the literature, the model that minimizes
the sum of discrepancies in absolute value is called the weighted GP model (WGP).
The norm L∞ is implemented by the GP model called MINMAX [2], in which D represents
the maximum deviation between the multi-criteria performance and the single-criterion
performances. The remainder of the variables keeps the same significance as in [1].
Achievement function:
Min D
s.t.
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Goals:
i=1, …, n, j=1, …, c  [2]
Hard constraints:
j=1, …, c
Accounting rows of model [1]
The  solutions  from  both  models  represent  extreme  cases  in  which  two  contrasting
strategies  are  set  against  one  another:  giving  the  advantage  to  the  general  consensus
(WGP) or giving it to the conflicting performance measures (MINMAX GP). 
There is an option that is of interest if one is seeking to find a compromise between [1] and
[2]; it is to have recourse to an extended GP model, in which the λ parameter makes it
possible to arrive at a more balanced solutions -model [3]-. Furthermore, solutions are
sometimes more efficient in the D-Z plane. With the extended model, decision makers
obtain  alternative  compromise  solutions  according  to  the  value  they  assign  to  the λ
parameter, and this broadens the range of possibilities when they have to decide what
multicriteria  performance  is  best  suited  to  and  the  most  representative  of  the  single-
criterion performances. Observe in [3] how if λ=1, the same solution is obtained as in
model [1]; whereas in the case of λ=0, the solution coincides with that of model [2].
Achievement function:
s.t.
Goals:
i=1, …, n, j=1, …, c
Hard constraints of model [2]
Accounting rows of model [1] [3]
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It may be the case that the decision maker has a neutral position regarding the value of λ.
This means, for the decision maker there is no value of λ which is better than the others.
Under this circumstance it is possible to elaborate one single ranking out of the rankings
obtained  for  the  different  values  of  λ,  simply  by  calculating  the  mean  of  the  values
obtained by the multicriteria performance for the different values of λ. 
INDICATORS  USED  IN  THE  MULTICRITERIA  MODEL  TO  EVALUATE
PATENT POOLS
As a major form of technological innovation, the value of patent right has been examined using
various criteria. The scientific linkage between backward citations and patent value has been
introduced by Narin et al. (1997) and then has been validated as indicators of patent value by
Harhoff  et  al. (2003),  Hagedoorn  and  Cloodt  (2003),  Lanjouw  and  Schankerman  (2004).
Citations received from subsequent arts, also known as forward citations, have also been
proved as an appropriate indicator of patent value by Trajtenberg (1990), Albert et al. (1991),
Harhoff et al. (2003), Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004), Reitzig (2004). Family size has been
validated as a patent right indicator by Putnam (1996), Lanjouw and Schankerman (2001),
Harhoff and Reitzig (2002) and Reitzig (2004). Building on earlier work by Pakes (1986),
Harhoff et al. (2003), constructive work done by Reitzig (2004) tests 13 well known measures
of the value of patent rights and provides the evaluation of patent rights from a corporate
perspective.  Other  indicators  such  as  claims,  ownership  and  oppositions  have  also  been
examined by Reitzig (2004). Based on the prior work, we use the following publicly available
patent characteristics as indicators in our Extend Goal Programming model: patent counts,
patent age, backward citations, forward citations, patent scope and family size. These are the
usual variables patent evaluation, although others can be considered as well (Wang, 2007).
4.1 Patent Counts
It is generally accepted by now that raw patent counts alone are not a good measure of the
inventive output of companies because of their bias and shortcomings (Archibugi, 1992;
Cohen and Levin, 1989; Dosi, 1988; Griliches, 1998). However, in large parts of the
economics literature, patent counts are widely applied as one of the most appropriate
indicators for comparing innovative performance of companies engaged in technological
competition, especially in the context of many high-tech sectors (Acs and Audretsch,
1989; Aspden, 1983; Bresman et al., 1999; Freeman and Soete, 1997; Griliches, 1998;
Patel and Pavitt, 1991; Pavitt, 1988). 
4.2 Patent Age
From a theoretical point of view, the patent value model essentially assumes that the
accumulated profit flows from patents increase monotonically during their lifetimes with
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exponentially decreasing marginal returns considering maintenance costs and emerging
new technology. Moreover, Matutes et al. (1996) take technology cycles into account and
strongly suggest that patent returns per period are not constant, but rather increase to the
global maximum of the technology cycle and then decrease again. Therefore, given the fact
that patent value is discounted with the passage of time, we assume that older patents are
less valuable. 
4.3 Backward Citations
The concept of ‘scientific linkage’ between patent value and references to prior patents
and non-patent literature was introduced by Carpenter et al. (1981) and the analytical
pioneer work was carried out by Narin et al. (1997). 
From  a  theoretical  and  applied  standpoint,  backward  citations  are  valid  correlates  to
patent value. Backward citations of patents are theorized to demonstrate the technical
novelty of a patent since through various references cited
Narin et al. (1997) and Harhoff et al. (2003) indicated that the measure for references to
the patent literature (backward citations) has a significant positive correlation with patent
value in all technical fields. Furthermore, a large number of citations to others also suggest
that  the  particular  innovation  is  likely  to  be  more  derivative  in  nature  (Lanjouw  and
Schankerman, 2001). 
On the other hand, however, it is plausible that a relatively small scope and low monetary
value should characterize a patent whose examination report contains a large number of
backward citations. The point-out logic behind this argument is that a patent application
seeking  to  protect  an  invention  with  broad  scope  might  encourage  the  examiner  to
delineate the patent claims by inserting more references.
4.4 Citations Received from Subsequent Patents (Forward Citations)
It  has  long  been  argued  that  the  value  of  patents  can  be  assessed  by  looking  at  the
frequency of citations that an innovation receives from subsequent works. The central
hypothesis is that patent citations are indicative of technological significance or impacts,
and are informative of the economic value of innovations as well. This suggestion received
considerable support in Trajtenberg’s (1990) study of a computed tomography scanner, in
which forward citations had been introduced and validated as indicators of patent value.
Evidence of the validity of forward citations as an indicator of the quality of innovations,
in terms of the correlation between the number of citations received from subsequent
patents and the value of patent rights have been found in numerous subsequent surveys,
e.g. by Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001; and Harhoff and
Reitzig, 2002;  Harhoff et al., 2003. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) further pointed out
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that the lifecycle of forward citations very probably suggests the expectation of valuable
technological areas. 
4.5 Patent Scope
The  scope  of  the  patent  is  a  strategic  decision  that  has  important  tradeoffs  for  the
innovator. Given that a patent is a set of exclusive rights granted for the patentee to
maintain a limited monopoly, to make it harder for potential competitors to enter the
patentee’s market with non-infringing innovations, the broader the scope of the patent, the
higher the protection (Green and Scotchmer, 1995; O’Donoghue et al., 1998). However,
this raises the likelihood of infringement and patent validity challenges by competitors
and/or third parties which, if successful, will reduce the effective life of the patent (Merges
and Nelson, 1990; Lerner, 1994; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001).
Theoretical patent literature in economics has modelled the tradeoff and suggests the
optimal structure for a patent. Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) consider a setting in which
broader patents are increasingly costly to society in terms of deadweight loss, therefore in
this  case,  the  optimal  patent  would  be  very  narrow  but  perpetual.  Klemperer  (1990)
considers a more realistic assumption in which consumers can switch either to a substitute
within the same product class or to one in another product class. In this model, either
narrow-but-long or broad-and-short patents could be the best. Lerner (1994) developed a
proxy  for  patent  scope  measured  by  the  number  of  four-digit  International  Patent
Classification (IPC) and showed that the value of biotech companies increases with the
‘scope’ of the patents they hold. Although other results show that the measure of scope
computed as the number of different four-digit IPC codes does not have explanatory power
over patent value (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2002), it is a good approximation of patent scope.
We  follow  Lerner’s  approach  and  generate  the  number  of  four-digit  IPC  codes  in  the
publication document as a measure of a company’s patent scope.
The breadth of patent protection sought for the innovation should also be reflected by its
claims. The innovator specifies the technological territory over which protection is claimed
and has an incentive to claim as much as possible (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001).
Empirical studies show positive and significant correlations between the value of a patent
and its number of claims (Tong and Frame 1992; Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001).
4.6 Family Size
In order to protect an innovation in multiple countries, a patentee must secure a patent in
each country. The group of patents protecting the same innovation is called its ‘family’,
also referred to as parallel patents. Putnam (1996) has argued that information on family
size may be well suitable as an indicator of patent value. Because applying for protection
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in each country is costly, family size should be directly related to the expected cost of
protecting an innovation and thus to the value of the innovation itself. Subsequent studies
also show that the size of a patent family, measured as the number of jurisdictions in which
a  patent  has  been  granted,  is  highly  correlated  with  the  value  of  patent  rights.
Furthermore,  family  size  should  reflect  both  the  technological  importance  of  the
innovation and market opportunities (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004)
To account for the potential explanatory power of “family size”, we obtained the number of
nations in which protection for a particular invention was sought from the EPO database.
A brief summary of the variables used in the analysis and their corresponding units is
presented in Table 1.
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TABLE 1.- INFORMATION ABOUT PATENT CRITERIA
OBSERVACIONES CRITERIA DEFINITION UNIT
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In our study, we examine licensor companies in the MPEG2 patent pool. There are 25
licensors in the MPEG2 patent pool, and 19 of them have valid patents out of a total
number of 770 within the patent pool when we collected the data based on the MPEG2
patent list on October 1, 2009. For all of the patents on the MPEG2 patent list, the value
determinants  are  available  from  the  European  Patent  Office.  We  must  remark  that  a
possible drawback of our research is the limited sample considered to run the model, so
the results only can be considered taking this shortcoming into account.
Number of patents Total valid patent counts Number of patents
Patent age Years between the patent registration and the date where  Number of years
they were collected in our research (2009-10-01)
Scope The number of digits used for technological protection Number of digits
Backward citations It is calculated as the ratio between the number of cited  Ratio
documents and the number of patents
Forward citations It is calculated as the ratio between the number of citing  Ratio
documents and the number of patents
Number of claims List of all the essential elements of the invention Number of claims
Family size Number of countries where the patent has protection Number of countries
5ALCATEL LUCENT 0.0417 0.0563 0.1667 0.2030 0.0674 0.2000 0.2400
BRITISH
TELECOMMUNICATIONS plc 0.0093 0.0085 0 0.6642 0.0674 0.3333 0.2400
CIF LICENSING, LLC 0.1898 0.1161 0.3333 0.5166 1 0.5167 0.5200
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 0.0370 0.2089 0 0.4982 0.0674 1 0.2000
FUJITSU 0.0231 0.1102 0 0.6089 0.1011 0.4167 0.1600
GE TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT, INC. 0.3009 0.5440 1 0.3321 0.1273 0.1583 0.5200
HITACHI, LTD. 0.0185 0.1749 00 0.0022 0.0733 0
KDDI CORPORATION 0 0.0099 00 0.0337 0.0833 0.0400
LG ELECTRONICS 0.0093 0.4008 0.1667 0.0923 0.0112 0.0778 0.0400
MITSUBISHI 0.5417 0.3889 0.5000 1 0.0442 0.1911 0.5200
PANASONIC CORPORATION 0.2315 0.1940 0.3333 0.3059 0.0260 0.0500 0.2800
PHILIPS 0.2269 0.3103 0.8333 0.3875 0.0655 0.1556 0.3600
SAMSUNG  0.0833 0.3266 0.3333 0.1937 0.0393 0.3854 0.2000
ELECTRONICS CO., LTD.
SANYO ELECTRIC CO., LTD. 0000000
SCIENTIFIC-ATLANTA LLC 0.0556 0.2386 0.3333 0.4797 0.7416 0.1389 0.3200
SONY 1 0.4172 0.8333 0.3730 0.2140 0.1949 1
THOMSON LICENSING 0.5278 11 0.3782 0.2725 0.1819 0.4400
TOSHIBA CORPORATION 0.0370 0.1803 0.1667 0.6421 0.3640 0.2133 0.0400
VICTOR COMPANY  0.1435 0.1454 0.3333 0.1265 0.1396 0.0167 0.2000
OF JAPAN, LIMITED (JVC)
Minimum 1510021
Maximum 217 16 7 18 89 62 26
Mean 40.5 10.8 3.0 6.5 15.9 15.9 8.0
Median 13 10.9 3 6.7 6.0 12.9 7.0
Standard deviation 54.4 3.0 2.0 4.7 23.0 13.6 6.0
21
In order to eliminate the skewness in patent data and avoid the danger of potential bias, we
use the method proposed by Diakoulaki et al. (1992) to normalize the dataset by the rank. 
i=1…n, j=1…c [4]
Normalized patent characteristics are presented in Table 2. A summary of basic statistics
for the original variables can also be found in the last rows of Table 2.
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TABLE 2.- NORMALIZED SINGLE-CRITERION MEASURES OF PATENT DATA
Company
No.of  Patent  Scope Backward Forward No. of Family size
patents age (5 digit) citations citations claims (country)
Note: Values for basic statistics have been calculated on original variables, not on the normalized ones.22 X. Wang, F. García, F. Guijarro, I. Moya
λ=0 0.1711 0.0081 0.3170 0.2611 0.0000 0.2427 0.0000 3.3333 19.8322
Dj (2.6329) (2.2500) (3.3333) (3.3333) (3.3333) (3.3333) (1.6159)
λ=0.1 0.1816 0.0713 0.1272 0.1586 0.0309 0.2117 0.2187 3.3576 19.4252
Dj (2.3545) (2.3232) (3.3576) (3.3576) (3.2787) (3.3576) (1.3961)
λ￿=0.2 0.1891 0.0830 0.0952 0.1382 0.0438 0.2060 0.2446 3.3642 19.3762
Dj (2.3033) (2.3465) (3.3642) (3.3642) (3.2571) (3.3642) (1.3768)
λ=0.3 0.1891 0.0830 0.0952 0.1382 0.0438 0.2060 0.2446 3.3642 19.3762
Dj (2.3033) (2.3465) (3.3642) (3.3642) (3.2571) (3.3642) (1.3768)
λ=0.4 0.1891 0.0830 0.0952 0.1382 0.0438 0.2060 0.2446 3.3642 19.3762
Dj (2.3033) (2.3465) (3.3642) (3.3642) (3.2571) (3.3642) (1.3768)
λ=0.5 0.1928 0.0888 0.0792 0.1280 0.0503 0.2032 0.2576 3.3675 19.3729
Dj (2.2777) (2.3731) (3.3675) (3.3675) (3.2526) (3.3675) (1.3671)
λ=0.6 0.2796 0.0384 0.0305 0.0834 0.0763 0.2205 0.2712 3.4360 19.3059
Dj (2.0693) (2.5866) (3.4360) (3.4360) (3.2839) (3.2174) (1.2767)
λ=0.7 0.2796 0.0384 0.0305 0.0834 0.0763 0.2205 0.2712 3.4360 19.3059
Dj (2.0693) (2.5866) (3.4360) (3.4360) (3.2839) (3.2174) (1.2767)
λ=0.8 0.2796 0.0384 0.0305 0.0834 0.0763 0.2205 0.2712 3.4360 19.3059
Dj (2.0693) (2.5866) (3.4360) (3.4360) (3.2839) (3.2174) (1.2767)
λ=0.9 0.2772 0.0233 0.1527 0.1206 0.0512 0.2059 0.1691 3.6137 19.2764
Dj (2.1126) (2.2749) (3.1966) (3.6137) (3.4061) (3.3850) (1.2874)
λ=1 0.2772 0.0233 0.1527 0.1206 0.0512 0.2059 0.1691 3.6137 19.2764
Dj (2.1126) (2.2749) (3.1966) (3.6137) (3.4061) (3.3850) (1.2874)
TABLE 3.- RESULTS OF THE EXTENDED GP MODEL [3] FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF  λ
No.of  Patent  Scope Backward Forward No. of Family size
DZ patents age (5 digit) citations citations claims (country)
The rankings are certainly not consistent based on different single criteria, except for
company  ‘SANYO’  with  0  for  all  criteria.  Using  the  normalized  data  into  the  above
mentioned extended Goal Programming model [3], we obtain the results in Table 3. In the
extended GP model, the weight assigned to each indicator varies depending on the value
of the λ parameter, as well as the degree of discrepancy between each single-criterion
performance  measure  and    multi-criteria  performance  ( )  and  the  degree  of  overall
deviation ( ).23 Evaluating patent portfolios by means of multicriteria analysis
The output differs as the value of λ changes, so alternative solutions are provided. The
WGP model produces the same solution as the extended one when λ=1. It assigns the
greatest weights to ‘No.  of patents’ (27.72%), ‘Forward citations’ (20.59%), ‘Family size’
(16.91%) and ‘Scope’ (15.27%) with a total weight of 75.64%. Consistent with this, the
lowest value of Z is reached. This solution can be interpreted as these four characteristics
are more representative of the majority trend, given that the consensus between all the
measures is maximized. 
The MINMAX GP model, with the same solution as the extended one with λ=0, offers a
solution that is at the opposite extreme from the WGP. In this case, the multi-criteria
model assigns more weights to ‘Scope’ (31.70%), ‘No. of claims’ (26.11%), and ‘Forward
citations’ (24.27%) with a total weight of 82.08%. In the MINMAX GP model the greatest
difference between the multi-criteria performance and the single-criterion performances is
minimized. It can be deduced that the indicators ‘Scope’ and ‘No. of claims’ are given
preference as the most conflicting measures whereas others λ like ‘Family size’ are given
a weight of 0, being penalized for sharing most information with the other criteria. These
two measures, ‘Scope’ and ‘No. of claims’ are referred to as ‘second generation’ and ‘third
generation’ indicators by Reitzig (2004) because they are used to compute value proxies
and are strongly correlated to the potential value of the patent portfolio. These indicators
are appealing because although they do not directly suggest patent value, they do reveal a
linkage with the technological breadth and depth of companies. 
For  any  λ,  indicators  ‘Patent  age’  and  ‘Backward  citations’  are  assigned  indistinctive
weights. This is not surprising because the correlation between these characteristics and
patent value are controversial in theory as stated above. Throughout all the situations in
the extended GP model, both ‘No. of patents’ and ‘Forward citations’ are assigned with a
weight  around  20%,  which  is  relatively  high  compared  to  others.  As  perceived  from
empirical  results,  for  companies  within  the  MPEG2  patent  pool,  the  more  obvious
technology power lies in the direct quantitative indicators of patents, in this case the
patent counts and the references received from subsequent papers.
Another interesting conclusion can be elicited when the Spearman correlation coefficient
is calculated for the rankings according to the corresponding value of λ. Table 4 reports
the Spearman correlation for rankings with λ=0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1. All values are
statistically significant for a confidence level of 99%, and the coefficients are in all cases
above 93%. In fact, the same ranking is obtained for λ=0.25 and λ=0.5. This means that
rankings are very similar regardless of the λ used in the goal programming model, and
therefore the results are robust to this parameter.24 X. Wang, F. García, F. Guijarro, I. Moya
TABLE 4.- SPEARMAN CORRELATION FOR RANKINGS WITH λ=0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 AND 1
OBSERVACIONES L=0 L=0,25 L=0,5 L=0,75 L=1
L=0 1 0,9754 0,9754 0,9316 0,9737
L=0,25 1 1,0000 0,9737 0,9912
L=0,5 1 0,9737 0,9912
L=0,75 1 0,9789
L=1 1
TABLE 5.- FINAL RANKING WITH THE 19 COMPANIES IN THE MPEG2 PATENT POOL
OBSERVACIONES COMPANY NAME RANK COMPANY NAME RANK
SONY 1 TOSHIBA CORPORATION 11
CIF LICENSING, LLC 2 VICTOR COMPANY OF JAPAN, LIMITED (JVC) 12
THOMSON LICENSING 3 FUJITSU 13
MITSUBISHI 4 BRITISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS plc 14
GE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT, INC. 5 ALCATEL LUCENT 15
SCIENTIFIC-ATLANTA LLC 6 LG ELECTRONICS 16
PHILIPS 7 KDDI CORPORATION 17
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 8 HITACHI, LTD. 18
PANASONIC CORPORATION 9 SANYO ELECTRIC CO., LTD. 19
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 10
1 The authors are grateful both to the editor of the Journal and two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions.
Using the information presented in Table 3 with the weights of the variables for the different
values of λ, we obtained the multicriteria performance of the patents of the companies.
Then, we ordered them from highest to lowest, obtaining 11 individual rankings, one for
each value of λ. As our position towards the value of λ is eutral, so as not to give more
importance  to  the  criteria  which  reflect  the  majority  trend  nor  to  those  with  most
discrepancy, it is possible to create a single ranking. To do so, we simply have to calculate
the mean multicriteria performance obtained by each firm in the 11 rankings. Table 5 shows
this final ranking.25 Evaluating patent portfolios by means of multicriteria analysis
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an extended GP model to combine 7 measures of patent value and
assess the relative position of the companies within a patent pool. According to what value
is assigned to the λ parameter, the extended GP model produces different solutions between
two extreme circumstances: decision makers can choose to what extent they want to
emphasize the trend criteria or overweight the most deviant measures. In our analysis,
alternatives  between  both  options  are  presented  for  a  number  of  quantitative  patent
measures and the potential patent value indicators. Based on the solutions generated
through our extended GP model of patent evaluation, ranking of 19 licensors within MPEG2
patent pool has been proposed. The proposed methodology empowers decision makers to
choose from various solutions the one which is best suited to their strategy for future
innovation purposes. This paper does not claim to solve the applied problem of valuing
patent portfolios from a corporate perspective. The truth is that the selection of the
performance measures themselves inevitably brings some level of subjectivity. It is our
consideration that the extended GP model serves to expand the latitude of methodologies for
patent portfolio assessment. Based on the results derived from the empirical research, the
multicriteria solution is optimal for patent evaluation in terms of taking all information into
consideration.  A  main  difference  compared  to  other  approaches  like  AHP  is  the
consideration of only quantitative information, thereby reducing the subjectivity when
including qualitative information. The multicriteria approach also enables the compilation
of several patent-related indicators, and avoids ranking the patents pool based on only one
particular indicator. Further research on the compilation of new indicators from patent
portfolio  valuation  rationales  would  add  new  perspectives  to  the  model.  Moreover,
conducting studies that combine company technological measures with financial indicators
would also be of great interest in order to improve current patent valuation methodologies.
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